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Abstract—Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of
research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet.
To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this pa-
per presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without
depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solu-
tion achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution
for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable
claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties
need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both
blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different
implementations in support of these two claim model properties
are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation
and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign
Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our
solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger, Digital Identity,
Zero-Knowledge Proof.
I. INTRODUCTION
Through businesses and institutions existing in an ecosystem
of mutual distrust, identity has gotten fragmented. This has led
to large amounts of our identity data being duplicated onto the
servers of authorities. Current identity solutions require us to
hold many plastic cards which we use to identify ourselves or
pay with. We need to have a username and password for many
different websites. This means that the individuals whose data
is stored have no -or little- control over this data. Furthermore,
these servers which collect privacy sensistive data become
prime targets for attacks: honeypots.
We still have a digital identity problem, even though so-
lutions have already been proposed for this identity problem
many decades ago. The concept of public keys has been around
since 1976, when Diffie and Hellman created their (Diffie-
Hellman) key exchange method. Based on this public key
concept, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) has been around since
1991 [1]. However, it has also been known for 19 years [2] that
PGP, made 27 years ago, is not being adopted. To this day this
adoption problem persists. There has yet to emerge a digital
identity solution that solves the digital identity schizophrenia.
Public key technology forms the birth of both the problem
and solution for digital identities. This is all of the cryptogra-
phy we require to securely communicate with other identities.
After all, public keys gave us confidentiality and integrity of
data. There is just the issue of having to tie such a public key
to an identity: a need for a Public Key Infrastructure. This is
the real issue we have tried to solve for all of these years.
Nobody trusts the Public Key Infrastructure of his competitor.
As such, a model which relies on central servers is doomed to
fail. This is why we do not see initiatives such as keybase.io
as a move forward to solve the identity problem.
More recent work has attempted to solve identity without
a central trusted third party. The concept is that one simply
exists, therefore one has a digital identity. The identity is
then built, managed and used by the owner of the identity.
No longer is the identity owner beholden to a single identity
authority. This is called Self-Sovereign Identity. Now, the
businesses and institutions no longer need to trust each other,
they just need to trust the user.
One might be tempted to say that the concept of Self-
Sovereign Identity finally solves our 27 year old digital identity
problem. However, whereas the businesses and institutions no
longer need to trust each other, they also do not trust the user to
be truthful. This paper will build upon the findings of previous
Self-Sovereign Identity initiatives such as Sovrin1 and uPort2
and leverages a blockchain to solve this trust problem. By
utilizing a blockchain, users can be tied to the claims they
make and hereby be caught red-handed if they attempt to cheat
the system. Users can be caught committing identity fraud.
In contrast to the previously mentioned solutions, this paper
will present an academically pure model for Self-Sovereign
Identity. In our model there does not need to be a foundation
assigning infrastructure. In our model there is no possibility
of the blockchain owner or 51% of the network to hard-fork
a user out of existence [3]. There will be no third party in
control of attributes: there will be no vendor lock-in. A key
property of our model is open enrollment: any user can simply
start using the solution without asking for permission.
The model of this paper has been created in cooperation
with the Dutch National Office for Identity Data (Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations). As such it will be the
second digital identity model in the world to be sanctioned
by a government (after Estonia). Through this cooperation
the solution of this paper can also leverage passport-level
biometry. The key contribution of this paper is to provide
these passport-level attributes for an academically-pure secure
open Self-Sovereign Identity standard. This paper describes the
concepts of a pilot which will be deployed to Dutch citizens
in the latter half of 2018.
1https://sovrin.org/
2https://www.uport.me/
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II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The first half of the problem we observe in the current
identity ecosystem, is the fact that identity holders should also
be the identity owners. This first half can be more formally
described as the need for Self-Sovereign Identity. The second
half of the problem consists of the passport-level attributes in
this identity. In other words, identities which are recognized by
governments and therefore have legal value. In the context of
blockchains we can formalize this second half of the problem
as the need for legally valid signatures. This section will first
explain the problems of Self-Sovereign Identity and then the
section will follow up with the description of legally valid
signatures.
A. Self-Sovereign Identity
The name Self-Sovereign Identity already hints at the fact
that in this model users have full control over their identity. We
will now explain what it means to be a sovereign of one’s self,
or in other words, to have full control over one’s own identity.
Thankfully, in the essay The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity
from 2016 [4], Christopher Allen has created a comprehensive
list of properties of Self-Sovereign Identity. We prefer this list
of properties over other works (like Zyskind et al. [5]), as
it is more extensive. For the full argumentation we refer the
reader to the essay; we will quote C. Allen’s 10 properties of
Self-Sovereign Identity for the reader’s convenience:
1) Existence. Users must have an independent existence.
2) Control. Users must control their identities.
3) Access. Users must have access to their own data.
4) Transparency. Systems and algorithms must be trans-
parent.
5) Persistence. Identities must be long-lived.
6) Portability. Information and services about identity
must be transportable.
7) Interoperability. Identities should be as widely usable
as possible.
8) Consent. Users must agree to the use of their identity.
9) Minimalization. Disclosure of claims must be mini-
mized.
10) Protection. The rights of users must be protected.
By leveraging a blockchain structure, one can observe that
some of these properties are intrinsically fulfilled. By running
a consensus mechanism, a global truth can be established
(according to at least 51% of the network) for each of
the published attributes. This consensus mechanism therefore
provides the transparency we were seeking. Furthermore, due
to the append-only nature of blockchains (once the information
has been accepted after a consensus round) the blockchain will
also provide the persistence of the published attributes.
By delving into more specialized blockchain structures we
can trim down this list of requirements even further. Chain
structures like that of TrustChain [6] and The Tangle [7]
provide a single chain per single user/application, or in this
case per identity. Full control is then given in these structures
to the user which owns one of these personalized chains,
without limiting the derived properties of transparency and
persistence from the general blockchain structure. By allowing
the identity to be based on a personalized blockchain, which a
user can create without any permissioning, this gives the user
the property of existence. Also, because the user creates and
maintains his own blockchain, this means the user has access
to this data and has to synchronize his data with the rest of the
world through his own effort. Through this conscious effort of
sharing data the user gives his explicit consent.
In conclusion, many of the properties of Self-Sovereign
Identity are intrinsically provided by leveraging a personal-
ized blockchain structure like TrustChain or The Tangle. By
leveraging such a personalized blockchain structure, we can
determine the properties the claims should fulfill to provide
for all of the 10 properties of Self-Sovereign Identity. The list
of open problems the claim format should solve is as follows:
• Portability
• Interoperability
• Minimalization
• Protection
This paper will add one further requirement for a Self-
Sovereign Identity system beyond these 10 principles of Self-
Sovereign Identity. Claims are not worth anything if they can
not be shown to hold true. These generic claims therefore also
need to be provable.
B. Legally valid signatures
A strict requirement for the adoption of any identity system
for government-level use, is the use of legally valid signa-
tures. That is to say that the signature algorithm and the
corresponding keys to use this identity should be of sufficient
quality. Sufficient quality is a vague directive in itself, which
we will interpret as usage of keys sampled from elliptic
curves which have been approved for government use by an
institute for standards, like the National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Of course, this list of “safe” curves updates
regularly and as such there are also many websites devoted to
keeping track of this (for instance https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/).
Next to the choice of a “safe” key, users of the system
should also be recognized by a government institution before
their signatures become legally valid. This means that the
goverment should recognize the existence of the user of the
“safe” key. Here the government is any other identity (or
keypair if you will) which is associated with the government.
This association might be realized through a hierarchical
construction or be sampled from a list of trusted keys. In our
model, we could also see this recognition as just another claim
attested to by the government.
Alongside the protection of citizens, legal signatures are also
required for auditing. That is to say that the global state of
the network should be readable for the government to detect
cheating. When a blockchain is utilized as an identity building
platform, double-spending attacks are now a criminal offense:
identity fraud. If a citizen commits identity fraud he should
be punishable by law. But, again, this can only happen if the
citizen is legally recognized to be bound to his signature.
III. DESIGN
As stated before, half of the design for our true Self-
Sovereign Identity model leans on the properties of person-
alized blockchain structures like TrustChain or The Tangle.
The other half will consist of claim structures which should
be portable, interoperable, minimized, protective and prov-
able. We will first start by examining a claim model which
satisfies these criteria, afterwards we will present the modeling
of these claims into a blockchain structure.
The claims which will be presented do not hold any intrinsic
truth. Users can make false claims and users can erase their
identity (also called a whitewashing attack [8]). That is to say
that information delivered by a user should only be regarded
as the truth, if the user can provide proof for the claim.
Establishment of truth will have to involve multiple parties,
which provide attestations [9]. The trust in other parties
attesting to the truth of a user’s claim then adds up to the
trust in the user’s claim.
A. Generic provable claims
The most important property of Self-Sovereign Identity,
regarding the design of claims, is that of protection. The user’s
right to privacy and the right to be forgotten can be joined into
the need for a mechanism to disclose information to specific
parties on demand. Furthermore, once shared, the information
the other party receives should not be fit for re-use. In other
words, the received information should hold truth only for the
party the information was disclosed to. This lends itself nearly
perfectly to a Zero-Knowledge Proof structure [10].
Usage of Zero-Knowledge Proofs also helps in the area
of minimalization. By designing the Zero-Knowledge Proofs
accordingly, one could limit the access to a single attribute to
only be provably within a certain range [11]. This is useful
when -for instance- sharing minimum levels of income. One
could prove a certain level of income without having the public
attribute stating the actual amount the income exceeds. The
existence of the attestation of “income is higher than $1” leaks
the fact that the income is higher than “$1”.
These Zero-Knowledge enabled claims then form the
portable and interoperable building block we required. The
claims do not require any blockchain to be evaluated and may
be shared with other platforms. But, even though these claims
would be able to be shared, they are not generic. The claims
are still missing a format for ease of use and easy upgrading:
the claims are still missing metadata. Our solution for the
claim metadata is given in Table I.
1) Name: The claim name should be a globally recognized
value for identification of a particular attribute. To share
infrastructure between attesting parties and verifying parties,
a naming convention should be present. In principle this
convention, or standardization, need only happen between the
verifying and the attesting party. However, issues can also
arise when one attesting party has a different perception of
an attribute than another attesting party. Should, for example,
the attribute “name” be a full name or a family name?
TABLE I: Claim metadata
Field Description
Name The name of the attribute
Timestamp The time of claim creation
Validity term The time after which the claim is no longer valid
Proof format The type of proof for the claim
Proof link The strong link to the proof for the claim
2) Timestamp: The timestamp is a means for fraud detec-
tion through auditing. By withholding revocations, users may
attempt to commit identity fraud. This can be mitigated by
storing the signature of the identity owner over a timestamp T1
and the tail (last hash) of the blockchain. A verifying party can
then prove that a revocation existed at a certain time T0 < T1
and hereby provide legal basis for identity fraud. Furthermore,
timestamps can also be used to issue unique challenges for
proof of key ownership: authentication using claims. Through
this challenge, proof of ownership of a second key can then
be shown by producing a signature using this second key. In
other words, this allows for deferred two-factor authentication
through claims.
3) Validity term: By attesting to the truth of values of
attributes of others, the attesting parties stake their reputation.
If an attesting party provides an attestation for an attribute and
it turns out to be wrong, one might even say that the attesting
party is complicit in identity fraud. As, in the real world,
values of attributes tend to change over time we can leverage
a validity term. After this term has expired, any attestations
provided for this claim are to be viewed as void in the eyes of
the beholder. The risk of using such an expired claim is then
fully deferred to verifying party.
4) Proof format: Just like in OpenSSL certificates, we find
the need to have a modular format to deal with advancements
in the field of cryptography. This means that if a better
proofing method is developed, the system has minimal up-
grading costs. This is a reality in the field of Zero-Knowledge
Proofs: in the span of just 2017 we have seen a several big
advancements ranging from Ethereum’s zk-SNARKs [12] to
Stanford’s Bulletproofs [13]. Next to being able to upgrade
easily, modular proofs also allow for different attributes to be
proven through different Zero-Knowledge Proofs. One might
want a Zero-Knowledge Range proof for their “age” and a
plain trapdoor function (note: which is not a Zero-Knowledge
Proof) might be enough to store a first name.
5) Proof link: All of the properties of the metadata are
voided if there is no link to the proof of the advertised
attribute in the metadata. Without a strong link to the proof,
it would be possible to cheat. This link must ensure that it is
verifiable by third parties that the proof they play out with the
identity owner is answered truthfully. There are many ways
to provide this verifiably truthful answering (one might for
instance leverage MIT’s Enigma [14] for publicly verifiable
computation or use UCL’s ClaimChain [15] to tie this proof
into the signature algorithm), but note that this mechanism will
change as the method for the Zero-Knowledge Proof changes.
Previous Chain Entries
Identification Metadata
Signature of Attesting Party
Signature of Identity Owner
(a) Claim Origin
Previous Chain Entries
Signature of Attesting Party
Signature of Identity Owner
Metadata Block
(b) Pure Attestation
Fig. 1: Blockchain blocks in the Passive Model, without revocation
Previous Chain Entries
Identification Intent
Signature of Verifier
Signature of Identity Owner
Metadata Block
Fig. 2: Intent block for detectable revocation
Previous Chain Entries
Intent Response
Signature of Identity Owner
Signature of Attesting Party
Intent Block
Fig. 3: Intent response block for real-time revocation
B. Chains of claims
Now that we have a definition for a claim which satisfies the
portability, interoperability, minimalization and protection
requirements, we will discuss how to integrate these into the
blockchain structure. Recall that we do this to provide the
transparency and persistence needed for audit logs and the
legal status of the identity system.
When designing this chain of claims, we recognize that
there are different use cases for claims. Some claims may
be expected to last forever (once one hits the age of 21, one
will never become younger). Some claims may not present
an active risk when used whilst being revoked (receiving
a parking permit for an address you no longer live at),
even though they should be detected and punished. Lastly,
in the worst case, some claims may require real-time proof
of correctness (not being a terrorist when checking in to
the airport). Depending on the use case for the attribute, we
identify three levels of escalation for the audit logs: a passive,
an intent-based and an active model. These approaches can be
seen as escalations of each other as they each add an additional
block to the chain, compared to the escalation level before
them. It should also be noted that these approaches are not
mutually exclusive. An identity chain can have each of these
escalations in it, even for the same attribute.
1) Passive: In Figure 1 a chain entry, or block, in the
passive model is given. These passive model blockchain
blocks may come in two forms, either that of a claim origin
(Figure 1a) or a pure attestation (Figure 1b). As the name
implies, the claim origin stores the original claim metadata
(as previously discussed in Section III) on the blockchain. In
the a pure model, this claim could be pushed to the blockchain
without the existence of any attestation by an attesting party.
However, since no claim is worth anything without proof, as
an optimization the block is only added to the chain when the
first proof is collected. Once the first attesting party signs for
the claim, the double-signed block is added to the chain. For
the same claim a user can then continue to receive attestations.
However, further attestations for the same claim need no
longer store the entire claim. Further attestations can simply
sign for the block hash of the block containing the claim to
avoid data duplication, as shown in Figure 1b.
Recall that all of these blocks are under the full control of
the identity owner. This is why the last signature is always
produced by the identity owner as he has the final say on
whether or not to include this block in his own personalized
blockchain. This is due to the Self-Sovereign Identity require-
ments of control and access.
2) Intent-based: When considering applications which re-
quire an audit log for eventual fraud detection, the intent-based
model can be used. This builds on the passive model by adding
an intent block to the blockchain structure, which is visualized
in Figure 2. As discussed in Section III-A for the timestamp
field, this block can be used to make identity fraud detectable.
Any party wishing to audit the global logs, need but examine
the revocation block and the intent block (both pointing to the
same hash of a metadata block of the identity owner) to find
the timestamp inconsistency. Note that the verifying party can
either store these blocks directly or wait for global consensus
to be reached, before transacting with the identity owner.
3) Active: In the worst case, an active check for revocation
is required. This is not a good fit for the slow consensus pro-
tocols required for blockchain. However, it is at the very least
not worse than the existing method. Regarding the liveness of
the attesting party, instead of the offline transactions for the
passive and intent-based models, we now require the attesting
party to be online. We can still leverage the intent-timestamp
method to provide a unique challenge for the attesting party, to
identify the identity owner. By providing this unique challenge
TABLE II: Details of Self-Sovereign Identity implementations
Name Context Blockchain Zero-Knowledge Proof Language
IPv8 app Dutch digital passport TrustChain Interactive Proof Python
IdentityChain TU Delft course TrustChain Interactive (Range) Proof Java, Kotlin
Group A TU Delft course Proof-of-Work based Non-Interactive Proof Python
Group B TU Delft course TrustChain Non-Interactive Proof Java
we show that the attesting party’s response is current and not
being replayed from an earlier response. By this method the
interaction is still just between (1) the verifying party and the
identity owner and (2) the identity owner and the attesting
party. The attesting party’s response is relayed by the identity
owner and as such the identity owner has full control (he gives
explicit consent for this message). In other words, at no point
do the attesting party and the verifying party communicate
without the knowledge of the identity owner.
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
Section III has presented a model which is blockchain ag-
nostic and Zero-Knowledge Proof agnostic. In support of this,
an implementation is presented which uses a Proof-of-Work
blockchain as well as implementations which use TrustChain.
Furthermore, these same implementations use different Zero-
Knowledge Proof methods. The different implementations
have been summarized in Table II and will be further detailed
in the remainder of this section.
As some of the implementations do not have a name, we
have assigned them a name (namely “Group A” and “Group
B”) for reference throughout the remainder of this paper. Note
that the IdentityChain, Group A and Group B implementa-
tions are based on student work for the Delft University of
Technology 2017/2018 Blockchain Engineering course. The
implementations are available online through GitHub.
The IPv8 Android app3 (or IPv8 Attestation App formally)
leverages our own TrustChain structure as its personalized
blockchain and uses a custom Zero-Knowledge Proofing struc-
ture. The IPv8 app stems from the peer-to-peer networking
framework called IPv8, which in itself is an amalgamation of
functionality from the elastic database system Dispersy [16]
and the BitTorrent client Tribler [17]. The attestation system
in the IPv8 app was the proof-of-concept which laid bare
the concepts of this paper and was developed to serve as
a solution for partial digitization of the Dutch passport. It
is currently being developed alongside claim-based biometry
for passport-level authentication, made by the Dutch passport
creator IDEMIA4. The details of this biometric system will
remain proprietary.
The implementation uses unique keys per attribute stored in
the blockchain. The keys themselves are 1024-bit EC keys in
Fp2 without public message space n, but otherwise constructed
as described by Boneh et al. [18] (over super-singular curve
y2 = x3 + 1). There is also another ed25519 key to publish
3https://github.com/Tribler/py-ipv8
4https://www.idemia.com/
data on the blockchain. The exact implementation of the Zero-
Knowledge Proofs will remain outside of the scope of this
paper (the implementation is available online however).
The authors note that the key size is overkill and Python is
not fit for either iOS or Android devices. Therefore the IPv8
codebase is being ported to Java and will be made part of
the TrustChain explorer app5. The app will then also support
different types of Zero-Knowledge Proofs, whereas the IPv8
app is currently limited to exact value proofs only.
IdentityChain is the first student work implemented in Java
and Kotlin for Android. The IdentityChain app6 requires a
fingerprint to access the chain. The supported Interactive
Zero-Knowledge Proofs are single valued and range proofs,
based on K. Peng and F. Bao’s work [11]. Only the default
TrustChain ed25519 key is required for using this system.
The second student work, wich we dubbed Group A,
implemented an identity system in Python with Javascript front
end. The app7 leverages a Bitcoin-like Proof-of-Work global
blockchain for sharing identity instead of using a personalized
blockchain structure. Note that the control principle of Self-
Sovereign Identities may waver if blocks are no longer added
blindly to the chain. A Σ-protocol implementation is then
utilized to provide Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
The final student work, Group B, implemented an identity
system in Java for Android. The app8 shares attestations
through QR-codes instead of using the Internet. The supported
Non-Interactive Proof is based on repeated hashing based on a
shared secret value. This system also only uses the TrustChain
ed25519 key.
V. EVALUATION
In this section the performance of the implementations
mentioned in Section IV will be analyzed. For real world
deployment we expect both the provable claim creation as
well as the claim verification to offer sub-second performance.
For each of the implementations in Table II the creation
time and the verification time has been measured. The results
of these measurements have been visualized as boxplots in
Figure 4. The boxplots have been grouped by implementation
number, for which the time to create a claim (labeled as attest,
constituting the left boxplot of the pair) and the time to verify
a claim (labeled as verify, constituting the right boxplot of
the pair) have been shown. As a benchmark, the ClaimChain
solution [15] has also been measured and included in Figure 4.
5https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=nl.tudelft.cs4160.trustchain_android
6https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/issues/3236
7https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/issues/3244
8https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/issues/3243
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Fig. 4: Claim creation (left half: attest) and claim verification (right half: verify) times per implementation.
For a fair comparison, the single value proof has been
measured for each implementation. The proof for a single set
value is the only one supported by all of the implementations.
Furthermore, whereas the IPv8 app, Group A and Group B
were capable of providing proofs for values of arbitrary length,
the IdentityChain implementation was restricted to 20 bytes.
As such the input values for all of the implementations were
sequences of 20 randomly sampled bytes. Each of these inputs
was then generated 100 times for each implementation to
produce the visualized data.
Recall that the implementation languages for the IPv8
app, IdentityChain, Group A and Group B were Python,
Kotlin, Python and Java respectively. This has consequences
for the timing measurements. Measurements for both the
Kotlin and Java programming languages were performed using
the System.nanoTime() call, which provides a mea-
surement granularity of nanoseconds. Measurements within
the Python programming language were performed using the
time.time() call, which provides measurement granularity
of 10−18 seconds. As the machine running all of the experi-
ments allocated one 3.20GHz CPU core, the theoretical maxi-
mum precision is then of course only about 10−10. Everything
measured beyond the nanosecond scale in Python can therefore
be assumed to be floating point error. As all of the measured
claim creation and verification times range in the dozens of
milliseconds, we will claim this to be insignificant.
Moving on to the analysis of Figure 4, we immediately see
that the claim creation time for the IPv8 app implementation
is much higher than that of other solutions. The most likely
explanation for this, is that IPv8 creates a new key for each
attribute. As such this new key will also have to be sent
with the claim, inflating the size of the claim and therefore
also slowing down the verification process. For the context
of securing passport attributes, this might be a worthwhile
performance trade-off though.
The IdentityChain implementation is by far the fastest of all
the measured implementations, but also the most restrictive.
The implementation is not as widely usable as the other
implementations, which do allow for arbitrary claim sizes.
This does show that a system tuned toward a specific input
size is faster than a general solution. In other words, when
modeling data in the general provable claim format, the choice
of a proof mechanism is vital for both claim creation speed
and claim verification speed.
The Group B is the most interesting in terms of timing.
Whereas all of the other implementations have a significantly
faster verification than creation time (even though it might
not be visible, this also holds for the IdentityChain imple-
mentation), the verification and creation times do not differ
significantly for the Group B implementation. Also, the Group
B implementation has the widest spread of claim verification
times. This makes the Group B implementation the most likely
target for a side-channel attack, linking verification times to
inputs.
Overall, disregarding the Group B implementation, we see
that claim creation is significantly slower than claim verifi-
cation. This is a good property, as claim creation will only
happen sporadically and claim verification will happen more
often. The real world analogue of this would be that one rarely
receives a new passport, but one more frequently has to show it
to others. We also note that this does not hold for ClaimChain.
Lastly, it should be noted that all of the implementations
achieve both claim creation as well as claim verification within
100 milliseconds. This makes the technology easy to use for
consumers and aids in the adoption of the technology, which
was one of the targets of this paper.
VI. RELATED WORK
The concept of using blockchains as vessels for identity
has been explained by Zyskind et al. [5]. Generalizing over
this concept, S. Azouvi et al. [9] present a modern approach
to Digital Identity through attestation. This work builds upon
that basic model of using digital signatures as attestations to
the truth of data. The added contribution of this paper over the
S. Azouvi et al. paper is attribute value hiding and deployment
in a permissionless and Self-Sovereign context.
In The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity [4] by C. Allen
definitions of and requirements for User-Centric and Self-
Sovereign Identity are given. The essay supports the need
for Self-Sovereign and User-Centric identity and explains
why the current solutions do not meet the Self-Sovereign
Identity requirements. This paper fullfills all of the mentioned
requirements of Self-Sovereign Identity.
In Blockchain-Enabled Self-Sovereign Identity [19] by
M.E.M. van Wingerde use-case driven requirements for
blockchain based Self-Sovereign Identity are given. These
requirements have formed the basis of the Dutch government’s
stance and policy on Self-Sovereign Identity. This paper can
be seen as the accompanying realization of those requirements,
forming a concrete model for Self-Sovereign Identity.
B. Kulynych et al. have presented ClaimChain, an approach
for chains of claims where the proof is part of the signature.
The paper presents its solution as a new standard, whereas this
paper is more focused on providing an overarching abstraction.
The entire concept of ClaimChain can then of course be
modeled as an implementation of the model of this paper.
As such, the ClaimChain would then also be interoperable
with other methods for claim proof. This also holds for other
specialized systems like for example SCARAB as presented
by Kokoris-Kogias et al. [20].
VII. CONCLUSION
After 27 years, the web of trust finally has a chance to
become reality. This paper has presented the ground work
for a Self-Sovereign Identity solution which is in production
in the Netherlands for use by citizens in the latter half of
2018. As such, this makes the solution of this paper the
second (after Estonia) digitized passport solution to go live
in the world. The solution of this paper is the world’s first
permissionless decentralized digitized passport and a true
peer-to-peer identity commons. For the first time, citizens will
become the owners of their own identities. No longer is the
identity of users in the hands of a single (federated) authority.
Next to granting the users the properties of Self-Sovereign
Identity, users are also prevented from cheating. Verifying
parties can efficiently capture an incriminating snapshot of the
user’s identity upon transacting. Thus, if users decide to play
out a proof which is incorrect, this will be detectable. As users
utilize legally valid signatures, this also means the individual
behind the user’s keys will be able to be punishable by law.
This paper has also presented methods of revocation
of attestations to attribute value truth. Through leveraging
blockchain consensus rounds, revocations can be efficiently
detected in the global network state. This forms an efficient
audit log which can be leveraged for pursuing legal action
against users whom committed identity fraud. For more severe
applications, a real-time request of truth can also be needed.
This real-time solution does not improve upon current solu-
tions, except for making sure that the flow of messages is
always through the user. Messages are never sent between
parties the user transacts with, without knowledge and explicit
consent of the user.
Implementations of the model of this paper are shown to
have both sub-second claim creation and sub-second claim ver-
ification time on modern hardware. This truly makes the Self-
Sovereign Identity as portable as a passport, while retaining
all of the benefits of digitization. Thusly, we have created the
new Dutch digital passport solution ready for global adoption.
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